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“No army inspired by the spirit of the Military Academy can ever endanger a 
country’s liberty or can ever desert its country’s flag.” 
 
– Secretary of War Elihu Root, 1902 
 
 
Elihu Root spoke these words upon a happy occasion – the centennial 
celebration for the United States Military Academy at West Point.  But Root surely 
knew, as most of his audience probably did, that 286 graduates of West Point had, 
in substantially less happy times just 41 years earlier, both endangered their 
country’s liberty and deserted its flag by opting to fight for the Confederate States 
of America in the Civil War.1  He also was no doubt aware that of the 86 Southern-
born cadets at the Academy in 1860-1861, 65 of them resigned, abandoning their 
training for the United States Army in order to serve the enemy instead.2 
With this in mind, Root’s statement takes on a strange tone.  Given the 
context in which it was made, it seems more than likely that the statement was 
intended as nothing more than a reflection of the high esteem in which West Point 
was held at the dawn of the twentieth century and an affirmation that another civil 
war could never occur.  Read literally, however, it can just as well be taken as a 
rather unsubtle criticism of the Academy’s checkered past.  Viewed in this light, 
Root’s words beg an interesting question:  to what extent were West Point cadets 
in the antebellum era “inspired by the spirit of the Military Academy”?  To put it 
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another way, to what extent, if any, did antebellum West Point inculcate its cadet 
corps with a sense of nationalism that operated as a countervailing force against the 
natural inclination of many Southerners to desert the Union and rush to the defense 
of their native states? 
At the time of the Civil War, many believed that the Academy was a 
miserable failure in this regard.  Public sentiment in the North regarding West 
Point was understandably hostile, given that the Academy had trained a good 
portion of the enemy’s officer corps, not to mention C.S.A. President Jefferson 
Davis (class of 1828).3  Much of the hostility came from the Republican Party, the 
leaders of which believed that the Military Academy “had been a breeding place of 
southern sentiment and was responsible for the defection of many officers to the 
rebel cause.”  Republican frustration with West Point was exacerbated by the 
alleged incompetence or intransigence of those graduates who commanded Union 
forces early in the conflict, with the slowness of General George McClellan, a 
Democrat, serving as the prime example.4 
Secretary of War Simon Cameron joined in the chorus condemning West 
Point, lashing out angrily at defecting Southern cadets and openly questioning 
whether their “extraordinary treachery” was the result of a defect in the Academy’s 
system of education.5  Radical Republican Senators such as Zachariah Chandler, 
Benjamin Wade, John Sherman, and Lyman Trumball bitterly denounced the 
Academy as a producer of traitors, decrying what they believed to be its pro-
Southern and pro-slavery influence, with some of them even going so far as 
attempting to have West Point abolished.  Radical attacks on West Point continued 
into 1863, when they were finally quelled for good by the impressive performances 
in service of the Union of Military Academy graduates Ulysses Grant, William 
Sherman, and Philip Sheridan.6 
The hindsight of history has been much kinder to West Point than Simon 
Cameron and the radical Republicans were.  Stephen Ambrose points out that the 
Academy was one of the last American institutions to divide when war broke out 
and one of the first to reunite when it was over.  Although West Point cadets felt a 
sense of obligation to the federal government for the education they had received, 
Ambrose asserts, “it plainly was unreasonable to expect most southern graduates to 
                                                 
3 West Point graduates serving the Confederacy included Generals Robert E. Lee (class of 1829), Joseph E. Johnston 
(1829), P.G.T. Beauregard (1838), Lafayette McLaws (1842), James Longstreet (1842), Stonewall Jackson (1846), 
George E. Pickett (1846), A.P. Hill (1847), John Bell Hood (1853), and J.E.B. Stuart (1854).  Gerard A. Patterson, 
Rebels from West Point:  The 306 U.S. Military Academy Graduates who Fought for the Confederacy 
(Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania:  Stackpole Books, 2002), 159-163. 
4 T. Harry Williams, “The Attack Upon West Point During the Civil War,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 
25 (Mar., 1939):  493, 495. 
5 Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 37th Congress, 1 st session, July 1, 1861, 28. 
6 Williams, 497, 504. 
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fight for the North.”7  James L. Morrison has refuted claims that West Point was 
dominated by pro-Southern or pro-slavery elements, and concluded that “the 
evidence strongly suggests that the antebellum Military Academy lent its weight to 
nationalism rather than sectionalism in the protracted struggle between these two 
forces which took place within the confines of the institution.”8  
The case against a Southern-dominated West Point in the antebellum years is 
a strong one.  As Morrison points out, in the ten years preceding the war, no 
department contained more than 40.5 percent Southern-born officers, and in only 
three departments, including the administrative staff, were more than one-third of 
the officers Southern-born.  In addition, a mere 14.8 percent of the 155 officers 
who served at the Academy between 1850 and 1861 joined the Confederacy, with 
more than one-third of all the Southern officers who taught at the Academy during 
this time remaining loyal to the Union.  As far as the cadets were concerned, 
Morrison notes that more Southerners were admitted to West Point between 1830 
and 1860 than their proportion of the population warranted, but this can be 
attributed to the poor quality of education in the South, as a result of which a 
disproportionate number of Southern cadets failed out of West Point, creating 
vacancies to be filled with other Southerners.9      
Despite the strong statistical evidence that antebellum West Point did not 
harbor a nefarious pro-Southern influence, many have alleged that those West 
Point graduates who deserted the Union were influenced to do so by the 
Academy’s curriculum itself.  The specific culprit was allegedly an 1825 textbook 
by Northern lawyer William Rawle entitled A View of the Constitution, which 
taught in no uncertain terms that every state had the constitutional right to secede 
from the Union (despite the fact that Rawle himself was no advocate of secession).  
Rawle noted that while the Constitution required that each state maintain a 
representative republican form of government, this requirement applied only as 
long as a state remained a voluntary member of the Union.10 
Unfortunately, the records of the Military Academy are not entirely clear as 
to exactly when or for how long Rawle’s book was used as part of the curriculum, 
but the evidence indicates that it was definitely used at some point.  Morris Schaff, 
a cadet from Ohio and a member of the class of 1862, stated in his memoirs that 
the book was used only from 1825 to 1827, but had a prolonged effect on the 
                                                 
7 Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country:  A History of West Point (Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1966), 182, 189. 
8 James L. Morrison, “The Struggle Between Sectionalism and Nationalism at Ante-Bellum West Point,” Civil War 
History 19 (June, 1973):  148. 
9 Ibid, 144-145. 
10 Walter D. Kennedy and James R. Kennedy, ed., A View of the Constitution of the United States of America by 
William Rawle:  Secession as Taught at West Point Military Academy (Baton Rouge, Louisiana:  Land and Land 
Publishing Division, 1993), 235. 
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Academy, particularly due to its influence on Jefferson Davis, who graduated in 
1828.11  In contrast, Confederate General Dabney H. Maury, a member of the class 
of 1846 from Virginia, believed that the book was introduced to the Academy by 
Secretary of War John C. Calhoun in 1822 (which must be inaccurate as the book 
was not published until 1825) and remained an official textbook until it was 
removed in 1861.  Maury claimed that he and the other West Point Virginians who 
served the Confederacy “were not only obeying the plain instincts of our nature 
and dictates of duty, but we were obeying the very inculcations we had received in 
the National School.”12   
It appears that Schaff’s account is more accurate than Maury’s, as an 
exhaustive search of West Point records conducted by Edgar Dudley in the early 
twentieth century reveals that Rawle’s book was probably used as an official 
textbook on constitutional law only in the year 1826, making Albert S. Johnston 
the only Confederate general to have been instructed in it.13  Moreover, Jefferson 
Davis denied reading A View of the Constitution and was said to be quite 
conversant with Kent’s Commentaries, a book replacing Rawle’s in the West Point 
curriculum and holding that secession was illegal.14  Thus, it seems that there is 
little case to be made that the West Point curriculum was to blame for the defection 
of Southern West Point graduates.        
If the Military Academy can be absolved of the charge of actively subverting 
the national loyalty of its graduates – and it appears almost certain that it can be – 
the question remains whether West Point actually did anything to affirmatively 
promote nationalism in the antebellum period.  Although there is some 
circumstantial evidence to suggest that it may have, there is very nearly a complete 
lack of direct evidence to support the point, and some evidence that the Academy 
did almost nothing at all. 
Like much of the evidence used to refute the charge of a pro-Southern 
influence, much of the circumstantial evidence to support the claim that West Point 
had a nationalizing effect on its cadets is statistical.  The most frequently cited 
statistic is as follows:  of the 343 officers on active duty at the outbreak of the war 
who were not West Point graduates, 99 of them, or 28.8 percent, defected to the 
Confederacy, while of the 655 active members of the West Point classes of 1830 
through 1860, only 161 of them, or 24.6 percent, left the Union.15 
                                                 
11 Morris Schaff, The Spirit of Old West Point, 1858-1862 (Boston and New York:  Houghton, Mifflin and 
Company, 1907), 231-232. 
12 Dabney H. Maury, “West Point and Secession,” Southern Historical Society Papers 6 (Jul.-Dec., 1878):  249. 
13 Edgar S. Dudley, “Was ‘Secession’ Taught at West Point?  What the Records Show,” The Century Magazine 
(Aug., 1909):  635. 
14 Fleming, 59. 
15 Morrison, “The Struggle Between Sectionalism and Nationalism,” 147. 
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These statistics do illustrate that a West Point graduate was less likely to 
desert the Union than a non-graduate, but they are nevertheless of limited utility.  
First and foremost, a crucial piece of information – the proportion of each group of 
officers that was Southern-born, and therefore would have had any desire to join 
the Confederacy in the first place – is missing.  Second, the difference of 4.2 
percent between the two samples is undoubtedly significant, but not overly large.  
Third and finally, the statistical information suffers from the problem inherent in 
all statistical data – it cannot by itself show causation.  Even James Morrison, who 
believes that West Point did have a nationalizing influence, admits that “it would 
be foolish to argue on the basis of these fragmentary statistics alone that the 
Military Academy was the sole, or even the most critical, determinant in tipping 
the scales toward the Union.”16   
There is other circumstantial evidence to support the claim that West Point 
promoted nationalism.  Defenders of the Academy pointed out that at the outbreak 
of the war, 65 of the 86 Southern-born cadets at West Point resigned, while other 
Northern educational institutions saw their entire Southern contingents depart.  
Emory Upton, a member of the class of May, 1861,17 asked rhetorically, “can 
Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Union, Princeton, or any other college in the land show 
a higher record of patriotism and sacrifice?  Assuredly not, for their Southern 
graduates espoused the rebel cause almost en masse.”18  The rejoinder to this 
argument is somewhat obvious, however.  George Pappas has noted that “civilian 
students, of course, had not taken an oath to support the government of the United 
States and had no matters of conscience to delay their departure.”19  In a similar 
vein, Stephen Ambrose points out that “the United States government was not 
providing four-year, all-expense scholarships” to other Northern schools.20  A 
comparison between West Point and other Northern schools is therefore clearly 
unfair. 
Some letters written by West Point cadets provide further circumstantial 
evidence of nationalism at the Academy.  For example, one particularly patriotic 
cadet was Samuel Nicoll Benjamin of New York, who graduated in May of 1861.  
When civil war appeared possible in early 1860, Benjamin “shuddered at the idea” 
of fighting against men who had been his fellow cadets,21 but by January of 1861 
he was prepared to do so, promising that “where [Winfield] Scott “Chief of Men” 
                                                 
16 Ibid, 147-148. 
17 Due to the exigencies of civil war, the Academy graduated classes in both May and June of 1861. 
18 Ralph Kirshner, The Class of 1861:  Custer, Ames, and Their Classmates After West Point (Carbondale and 
Edwardsville, Illinois:  Southern Illinois University Press, 1999), 16. 
19 Pappas, 332. 
20 Ambrose, 182. 
21 Letter from Samuel Nicoll Benjamin to family, February 14, 1860, Samuel Nicoll Benjamin Papers, USMA 
Library Special Collections. 
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leads I will follow, and if I should fall it would be fighting in defense of the Union, 
given to us by Washington and the giants of that day.”22  A short time later he 
reaffirmed, “I shall be true to my oath of allegiance, and fight for our flag and 
Union.”23  There is nothing to indicate, however, whether or not Benjamin’s 
patriotism was a result of West Point’s influence. 
Moreover, Benjamin’s sentiments are somewhat atypical of antebellum West 
Point cadets.  Most cadet letters from this period focus on the more mundane 
matters of everyday life at the Academy – the rigor of the academic program, the 
monotony of drills and formations, the poor quality of the food, health concerns, 
and perhaps above all, the cadets’ never ending obsession with their class rank.  
The letters are also generally devoid of a sense of pride in being a cadet at West 
Point, training to be an officer, or serving the country.24   
This is certainly true of the letters of Henry A. du Pont of Delaware, the 
highest-ranking member of the class of May, 1861.  Like most cadets, du Pont was 
primarily concerned with getting through West Point and attaining a high class 
rank.  Occasionally, however, he did address weightier matters, such as his father’s 
desire that he resign from the army after graduation, apparently because he wished 
to see Henry establish himself in business.  In 1858, du Pont told his aunt that he 
was reluctant to adhere to his father’s wishes.  His reasons for this stance, however, 
stemmed more from the dishonor that would be involved in breaking his oath to 
serve in the U.S. army than from a sense of nationalism.25  A year later he again 
expressed reluctance to resign, this time attributing his feelings to a sense of 
obligation to West Point for providing him with an education, but not to an 
affirmative desire to serve his country.26  In fact, on the same day Samuel 
Benjamin declared his willingness to die for the Union, du Pont wrote to his 
family, “I know if Delaware was in a similar position to South Carolina I should 
consider it my duty to resign at once and go home.”27 
On April 14, 1861, in the immediate aftermath of the Confederate 
bombardment of Fort Sumter, du Pont told his father, “I regret now that I am at this 
juncture in the service of the U.S.”  To his disappointment, however, he could see 
“no honorable mode of leaving it.”  He therefore resolved, unhappily, to do his 
                                                 
22 Letter from Samuel Nicoll Benjamin to family, January 5, 1861. 
23 Letter from Samuel Nicoll Benjamin to family, January 23, 1861. 
24 See, e.g., letters of George Horatio Derby (class of 1846), letters of George Cushing (class of 1858), letters of 
Thomas C. Bradford (class of 1861), letters of William Anthony Elderkin (class of 1861), letters of William H. 
Harris (class of 1861), letters o f Jacob F. Kent (class of 1861), letters of Alfred Mordecai (class of 1861), letters of 
Charles E. Patterson (class of 1861), letters and memoirs of George A. Woodruff (class of 1861), USMA Library 
Special Collections. 
25 Letter from Henry A. du Pont to aunt, October 31, 1858, in Stephen E. Ambrose, ed., “West Point in the Fifties:  
The Letters of Henry A. du Pont,” USMA Library Special Collections. 
26 Letter from Henry A. du Pont to family, June 11, 1859, in Ambrose. 
27 Letter from Henry A. du Pont to family, January 5, 1861, in Ambrose. 
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sworn duty and defend the Union.28  He was greatly influenced in this decision by 
his father, who firmly believed that a soldier’s primary loyalty should be to his 
nation, and not to his state.29  A week later, du Pont became more militantly pro-
Union, based on his being “disgusted” at the “spitting on the heads of Union men 
from the galleries in the Virginia convention” and “anarchy in Maryland,” but it 
seems clear that his change of heart had nothing to do with West Point.30 
The letters of Tully McCrea, a member of the class of 1862, suggest that 
nationalism was somewhat dormant at West Point until the attack on Fort Sumter 
revived it.  On April 21, 1861, McCrea wrote, “the cadets from the northern states 
are perfectly united in sentiment and feelings; all are ready to defend the Stars and 
Stripes and uphold the government in its endeavors to quell the treason of the 
southern states.  It is the first time since I have been here that I have seen them so 
united.”  He then described a Union meeting held in one of the cadets’ rooms, 
during which patriotic songs were sung and the cadets cheered the Union troops.  
McCrea noted that “such cheers were never heard here before,” and that the 
Southerners still left at the Academy “were not expecting such a universal outburst 
of patriotic indignation.”31  It seems, then, that external events, rather than anything 
that occurred within the walls of West Point, stirred up nationalism among the 
cadets.  Moreover, when McCrea’s relatives from Mississippi, the state of his birth, 
begged him to resign from West Point and join the Confederacy, he declined, but 
cited as the basis for his loyalty to the Union only the fact that he had spent most of 
his life in Ohio, and mentioned nothing having to do with West Point.32 
In April of 1861, at the same time McCrea was writing of the patriotic fervor 
among the Northern cadets, some members of the class of 1861 sent a petition to 
the Secretary of War asking that they be allowed to graduate early and join in the 
defense of their country.  It would be a mistake to accept this uncritically as 
evidence of nationalism at West Point, however.  Samuel Benjamin eagerly signed 
the petition, in accordance with his patriotic desire to fight for the Union.33  But not 
all who signed the document had similar motives.  Stephen Carr Lyford, Jr., a 
member of the class of June, 1861, also signed the petition, but for very different 
reasons.   
As Lyford explained to his family, he and many of his fellow cadets hoped 
to enter the army early in order to fill the vacancies left by officers who had 
                                                 
28 Letter from Henry A. du Pont to father, April 14, 1861, in Ambrose. 
29 Mary Elizabeth Sergent, They Lie Forgotten:  The United States Military Academy 1856-1861 (Middletown, New 
York:  The Prior King Press, 1986), 94. 
30 Letter from Henry A. du Pont to father, April 21, 1861, in Ambrose. 
31 Letter from Tully McCrea to Belle McCrea, April 21, 1861, in Catherine S. Crary, ed., Dear Belle:  Letters from a 
Cadet & Officer to his Sweetheart, 1858-1865 (Middletown, Connecticut:  Wesleyan University Press, 1965), 82-83. 
32 Letter from Tully McCrea to Belle McCrea, May 11, 1861, in Crary, 95. 
33 Letter from Samuel Nicoll Benjamin to mother, April 16, 1861. 
  8 
defected to the Confederacy.  Lyford believed that if he joined the army right 
away, he would most likely hold the rank of captain by the end of the war – a 
position that normally took fourteen years to attain.  “Hence you can see,” he 
concluded, “it is of vital importance for us to use every exertion to secure our end.  
If Mr. Cameron does not do something for us, a number of our class will resign 
and enter the Militia.”34  Similarly, although he ultimately decided not to sign the 
petition, Henry du Pont acknowledged that had he done so, it would have been “in 
a purely professional point of view.”35  So, while cadet letters do provide some 
circumstantial evidence of a nationalizing influence at West Point, they also 
illustrate that some cadets lacked feelings of nationalism, and reveal that others 
who took actions that seemed to be patriotic in nature were in fact motivated by 
more selfish concerns.                          
Compounding the weakness of the circumstantial evidence is the difficulty 
in finding any direct evidence that West Point attempted to instill its cadets with 
nationalism in the antebellum period.36  A look at the Academy’s curriculum in the 
antebellum years is instructive in this regard.  Put simply, West Point was an 
engineering school, and little else.  As a result, the majority of the books in its 
library dealt with science, math, and engineering, as well as military affairs.  In the 
classroom, humanities were paid little attention; math, science, and engineering 
took up most of the classroom time and counted more heavily than anything else in 
calculating merit rankings.37  In fact, as William Skelton has noted, until the mid-
1850s, “cadets devoted well over twice as much classroom time to mathematics, 
physical science, and engineering as to all other subjects combined.”38  James 
Morrison has pointed out that “the men who controlled the institution viewed its 
mission as being the production of engineers who could also function as soldiers 
rather than the reverse.”39 
The specific courses taught and books used at West Point in the years before 
the Civil War reveal nothing in the curriculum that would tend to imbue the cadet 
corps with a sense of nationalism or patriotism.  In 1846, to take as an example a 
                                                 
34 Letter from Stephen Carr Lyford, Jr. to family, April 17, 1861, Stephen Carr Lyford, Jr. Papers, USMA Library 
Special Collections. 
35 Letter from Henry A. du Pont to father, April 14, 1861, in Ambrose. 
36 James Morrison cites one piece of direct evidence on this score – a letter from Truman Seymour, a member of the 
class of 1846 from Vermont, who “declared that cadets seldom argued over sectional issues and that the faculty 
made a special effort to stimulate devotion to country.”  Morrison, “The Struggle Between Sectionalism and 
Nationalism,” 143. 
37 James L. Morrison, The Best School in the World:  West Point, the Pre-Civil War Years, 1833-1866 (Kent, Ohio:  
The Kent State University Press, 1986), 90-91.  
38 William B. Skelton, An American Profession of Arms:  The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861 (Lawrence, Kansas:  
University Press of Kansas, 1992), 168. 
39 Morrison, The Best School in the World, 101. 
  9 
year in which many future Civil War generals were cadets,40 the Fourth Class (or 
first-year cadets) studied mathematics, French, and English grammar; the Third 
Class studied the same subjects in addition to drawing; the Second Class studied 
natural and experimental philosophy, chemistry, and drawing; and the First Class 
cadets were instructed in Professor Dennis Hart Mahan’s famed Engineering and 
Science of War course in addition to ethics, infantry tactics, artillery, and 
mineralogy and geology.41  The only significant changes to this course of study in 
the ensuing years were the addition of a course in practical military engineering for 
the First Class, and the addition of courses in artillery and cavalry and infantry 
tactics for the lower classes.42 
This course of study is unsurprising, for Professor Mahan, who was largely 
responsible for the content of the Military Academy’s curriculum, did not place a 
high priority on the study of liberal arts or history.  In fact, it seems that he actively 
discouraged the inclusion of such areas of study at West Point.  As one historian 
has observed, “the great goal of the military academy, Mahan believed, was to 
furnish a solid foundation of scientific and military education. . . . Anything which 
detracted from this governing objective must be pruned away ruthlessly.”43 
The Academy’s overwhelming emphasis on science and engineering to the 
exclusion of the humanities did not please everyone, however.  In 1854, the Board 
of Visitors, a group of outside observers who annually conducted a thorough 
review of every aspect of life at West Point and issued a detailed report containing 
evaluations and recommendations for improvement, expressed its disappointment 
at the narrowness of the curriculum.  In particular, the Board complained that “the 
subject of history is not taught in the academy, very much to our regret, as it is 
certainly a branch of great importance, especially the history of our country and 
military history – this should not be neglected.”44  The Board did not state 
explicitly that its desire for the inclusion in the curriculum of United States history 
was the result of its perception that such study would tend to instill the cadet corps 
with a greater sense of nationalism, but this seems a likely motivation.   
Perhaps partially in response to this complaint, the Military Academy added 
a fifth year to its course of study beginning in 1855, and began to instruct the Fifth 
Class in Lossing’s History of the United States as part of its course in “English 
                                                 
40 See John C. Waugh, The Class of 1846:  From West Point to Appomattox:  Stonewall Jackson, George McClellan, 
and Their Brothers (New York:  Warner Books, 1994). 
41 Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the United States Military Academy, 1846 (USMA Library, 
accessed July 9, 2003); available from http://www.library.usma.edu/; Internet. 
42 See, e.g., Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the United States Military Academy, 1852 (USMA 
Library, accessed July 9, 2003); available from http://www.library.usma.edu/; Internet. 
43 Thomas E. Griess, “Dennis Hart Mahan:  West Point Professor and Advocate of Military Professionalism, 1830-
1871” (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1969), 242. 
44 Annual Report of the Board of Visitors for 1854, USMA Library Special Collections. 
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Studies and Literature.”45  This did not fully satisfy the Board, however, which 
continued to bemoan the lack of humanities training at West Point.  In 1856 the 
Board recommended the establishment of a permanent professorship of English 
that would have dominion over studies in grammar, logic, rhetoric, chronology, 
history, intellectual philosophy, principles of government, and fine arts.46  This 
suggestion was evidently ignored.  Moreover, by 1859 the Academy no longer 
used a textbook devoted exclusively to United States history, as the First, Second, 
and Fifth Classes were instructed in Max Weber’s Outline of Universal History 
instead.47   
All in all, the West Point curriculum in the antebellum years was 
characterized by a heavy emphasis on the technical and the practical, and any 
attempt to look to the course of study as a source of nationalistic pride would seem 
to be in vain.48  The fact that this was never the Academy’s goal is confirmed by a 
1946 pamphlet, published by the Academy itself, detailing the history of West 
Point’s educational objectives dating back to its formation in 1802.  The 
publication, which is divided into three separate sections dealing with the 
curriculum itself, the physical training of the cadets, and the building of character, 
makes no mention of a desire to inculcate cadets with a feeling of nationalism or to 
impress upon them a sense of pride in training to defend their native land.49 
James Morrison nevertheless attempts to find evidence of nationalism at the 
antebellum Military Academy in the cadets’ daily routine, asserting that “the 
student faced daily reminders that he had come to West Point for the one purpose 
of preparing to become an officer in a national army; every formation, drill, and 
ceremony kept that fact before him.”50  But might exercises such as formations and 
drills merely have turned the cadets into soulless automatons instead of filling 
                                                 
45 Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the United States Military Academy, 1855 (USMA Library, 
accessed July 9, 2003); available from http://www.library.usma.edu/; Internet.  The Annual Report of the Board of 
Visitors for 1855 states that Hale’s History of the United States was used and that the First Class was instructed in 
history (rather than the Fifth), but this conflicts with the more likely accurate account in the Official Register. 
46 Annual Report of the Board of Visitors for 1856, USMA Library Special Collections. 
47 Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the United States Military Academy, 1859 (USMA Library, 
accessed July 9, 2003); available from http://www.library.usma.edu/; Internet. 
48 It should be noted, however, that at least one historian does believe that the West Point curriculum had some 
nationalizing effect.  In his discussion of mid-nineteenth century filibustering expeditions, Robert May notes that 
despite the pro-filibustering tendencies of some U.S. army officers, most were hostile to filibustering because they 
viewed it as undermining the professionalism of the military as well as the nation’s honor.  “West Pointers,” writes 
May, “who were educated at government expense, exposed to a curriculum that incorporated ethics and international 
law, and increasingly numerous within the officer corps, perhaps naturally professed such attitudes.”  Robert E. 
May, Manifest Destiny’s Underworld:  Filibustering in Antebellum America (Chapel Hill and London:  The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 130.   
49 Sidney Forman, The Educational Objectives of the U.S. Military Academy:  A Historical Study of the Basic 
Academic, Physical and Character Training Aims of the United States Military Academy , Bulletin No. 2 (West 
Point, New York:  USMA, 1946). 
50 Morrison, “The Struggle Between Sectionalism and Nationalism,” 142. 
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them with love for their country, especially if such rituals were not explicitly 
linked to a sense of patriotism?  At least one cadet thought so.  John Tidball, an 
Ohioan in the class of 1848, noted in his memoirs that his drills were often 
sufficient “to extinguish the Fourth of July or Magna Charta spirit from the most 
rampant of cross-road patriots.”51 
Ironically, Morrison himself seemed to recognize the drawbacks of the 
Academy’s regimentation when he penned, a year after his assertion that drills 
promoted nationalism, that “taken in totality the institution must have encouraged a 
mechanistic outlook. . . . Success at the military academy depended primarily on 
the exactitude with which a student met requirements imposed by an instructor, a 
textbook, or a set of regulations; initiative and imagination, if not actively 
penalized, were not rewarded.”52  West Point’s mechanistic approach to regulating 
every aspect of a cadet’s life was partly behind Simon Cameron’s aforementioned 
attack on the Academy in 1861.  Cameron believed that the defections of Southern 
graduates and cadets could be blamed to some extent on the fact that the Academy 
drew little distinction between acts that were inherently wrong and acts that merely 
violated regulations, resulting in the confusion of right and wrong and “in the 
decision of grave moral questions, [the substitution of] habit for conscience.”53 
Not only is there a lack of evidence to support the proposition that drills and 
formations inspired nationalism, it seems that in some instances where the 
antebellum Academy had a clear chance to imbue its ceremonies with patriotism, it 
failed to do so.  John Tidball describes in his memoirs the West Point graduation 
ceremony, which seemed to consist mostly of a ritual whereby graduating cadets 
would remove their hats and kick them, but little else.54  Absent from Tidball’s 
description is anything of a nationalistic nature, including the playing of the Star 
Spangled Banner or other patriotic songs.   
The Academy’s failure in this regard was not total, however.  George 
Horatio Derby, the noted American humorist and a member of the class of 1846, 
reported in 1844 that George Washington’s birthday was marked at West Point 
with fireworks, rockets, and the performance of several patriotic songs, including 
the national anthem.  To Derby, the patriotic displays were “quite exhilarating.”55  
Other cadets recorded the details of July 4th celebrations that included an artillery 
salute, a processional march, a reading of the Declaration of Independence, a cadet 
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oration, and a celebratory dinner with the drinking of patriotic toasts (although this 
one-day exemption from the ban on cadet drinking was eliminated in 1838).56  
These holiday celebrations provide virtually the only direct evidence that West 
Point did anything affirmative to promote nationalism among its cadet corps. 
Of course, the Academy did require each new cadet to take an oath of 
loyalty to the United States and the Constitution.  The effect of this oath upon the 
cadets is questionable, however.  The events of 1860-1861 apparently convinced 
Congress that the existing oath was inadequate, as it passed two new laws; the first, 
passed in August of 1861, required the cadet to take an additional oath promising 
that he would “maintain and defend the sovereignty of the United States paramount 
to any and all allegiance, sovereignty, or fealty I may owe to any state, county, or 
country whatsoever”; the second, passed in July of 1862, required a cadet to swear 
that “he had never borne arms against the United States, given aid to her enemies, 
held office under any authority hostile to the United States, or supported any 
‘pretended government, power or constitution within the United States, hostile 
thereto’.”57 
John Tidball recounted in his memoirs an anecdote suggesting that the oath 
may not have had the effect on the cadet corps that West Point and Congress 
intended.  When Tidball’s class took the oath in 1844, one of their number, Enoch 
Q. Fellows, declined to do so, saying he no longer wished to be a cadet.  He was 
not allowed to resign; instead, officers, professors, and his fellow cadets attempted 
to convince him to take the oath, to no avail.  For months the matter seemed 
forgotten, until one spring day during drills.  Abruptly halting drills, the 
commandant brought the cadets into formation so that they formed three sides of a 
square in front of the superintendent’s house.  With great formality, Fellows was 
called to the front.  As Tidball claimed in his memoirs, the cadets were prepared to 
take action upon realizing that Fellows might be flogged: 
By glancing to the right and left I observed a rebellious 
pallor gathering on the faces of many, while others 
flushed scarlet with the hot blood of defiance.  And this 
was not confined to us alone, his classmates; the feeling 
ran, as if by corps sympathy, through the whole body. 
 
Fortunately for all concerned, Fellows was not flogged.  Instead, the doors to 
the superintendent’s house opened, and the superintendent emerged with the entire 
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military and academic staff behind him.  A Bible was produced, and Fellows, 
undoubtedly cowed by the whole proceeding, took the oath.58   
Significantly, however, Tidball and his comrades, rather than being angry 
with their fellow cadet for refusing to take the oath, were willing to risk their own 
standing to defend him from what they perceived as official tyranny.  Although 
Tidball’s memoirs cannot be taken as gospel in this regard, as they represent the 
word of only one man and were written years after the fact, they nevertheless tend 
to support some historians’ belief that West Point did produce new loyalties, but 
these loyalties were “less to the nation as an abstract ideal than to one’s classmates, 
West Point, and the army.”  In this way, the Academy has been described as 
creating “a band of brothers,” and a “corporate identity among army officers.”59  
This is not, of course, the same thing as creating nationalism. 
Another way in which James Morrison has sought evidence of nationalism at 
West Point is by looking at the Academy from the outside – specifically through 
the annual reports of the aforementioned Board of Visitors.60  This is a difficult 
way to gauge the climate of life at West Point, however, as the members of the 
Board visited only once a year to conduct their inspections and examinations, and 
were not present for everyday events.  Moreover, a closer look at the Board’s 
annual report for 1838 – which Morrison cites as an example – demonstrates the 
problems inherent in relying on this type of evidence.   
The Board did indeed praise West Point’s nationalistic spirit that year, but 
the words it chose to express this sentiment sound more like a hope for the future 
than a statement of present affairs:  “Surrounded by so many recollections of the 
glorious struggle of our forefathers in the cause of liberty, in sight of the 
monuments that commemorate them, the American youth cannot fail to imbibe 
strong feelings of patriotism and a love of country, which form the best security for 
the maintenance of our independence.”61  Moreover, the flowery language the 
Board employed included no mention of anything West Point affirmatively did to 
stir up nationalism among the cadet corps, suggesting instead that the cadets would 
become inspired merely by their presence at the Academy.   
Although it would have been manifestly unfair to charge West Point with the 
responsibility of uniting the entire country, it would not have been unreasonable to 
expect the institution to take measures to deal with sectionalism within its own 
walls.  Sectionalism had been a part of West Point’s culture since its founding in 
1802, but became much worse, as it did throughout the nation, in the 1850s.  John 
Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry in 1859 infuriated Southerners and sent shock 
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waves through the cadet corps, but slavery was not the only issue that divided 
North and South; the difficulty Southern cadets often had in competing with better 
educated Northerners was also a source of tension.  As a result of what eventually 
became rampant sectionalism, fistfights between Northern and Southern cadets 
became commonplace at West Point.62  Moreover, cadets in this period would 
often scheme to get themselves assigned to companies that were more Northern or 
Southern in nature.63 
Morris Schaff, who attended West Point from 1858-1862, at the height of 
sectional tension, recorded in his memoirs that officers and cadets generally tried 
to avoid discussing political events that divided the nation, as such discussions 
were deemed unbecoming for those pledged to serve the country.  Nevertheless, 
Schaff admitted that the cadets “were in miniature the country itself,” and that once 
letters and local papers from home brimming with “consciousness of a national 
crisis” arrived, “it was not long before [such consciousness] was felt at West 
Point.”64 
As James Morrison points out, West Point did make some efforts to suppress 
sectionalism within the cadet corps.  Specific examples included forbidding the 
Dialectic Society (a cadet literary, dramatic, and debating group), in the early 
1840s, from debating whether a state had the power to nullify a federal law, 
removing from a textbook those chapters discussing the morality of slavery, and in 
1858, not allowing cadets to attend a nearby church where the minister was 
preaching abolition.  Nevertheless, admits Morrison, sectionalism persisted despite 
these efforts.65  Moreover, while actions such as these may have had some negative 
effect on sectionalism, they were hardly calculated to have a positive effect on 
nationalism.   
Furthermore, it seems that beyond these isolated examples, West Point did 
not do anything to address sectionalism on an everyday basis.  The annual reports 
of the Board of Visitors, which examined life at the Academy in minute detail, are 
instructive in this regard.  In not one report between 1850 and 1861 did the Board 
address the growing sectionalism among the cadet corps (including the 
increasingly frequent fistfights), nor did it document anything the Academy was 
doing to combat the problem.66  In fact, the Board’s only references to the subject 
of sectionalism or nationalism in the 1850s were a suggestion in 1851 that the 
Academy display military trophies to inspire patriotism in the cadets,67 and another 
flowery proclamation of West Point’s nationalizing character two years later, 
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which included the assertion that “no sectional or social jealousies can here be 
awakened.”68  Nevertheless, as Thomas Fleming has noted, “sectional bitterness” 
was “already mounting” by the time Robert E. Lee became West Point’s 
superintendent in 1852.  According to Fleming, Lee did what he could to ease the 
tensions, reminding cadets that they were part of a “band of brothers,”69 but West 
Point instituted no formal program for combating sectionalism or promoting 
nationalism. 
In sum, the circumstantial evidence that West Point affirmatively promoted 
nationalism in the antebellum period is weak, and direct evidence on the point is 
nearly nonexistent.  It is important to note, however, that the failure of West Point 
to affirmatively promote nationalism among the cadet corps is not necessarily to 
blame for the defections of Academy graduates and cadets.   As Morris Schaff 
eloquently noted, Southerners had powerful forces drawing them toward the 
Confederacy that may have been stronger than any countervailing forces West 
Point could have brought to bear.  Believing it to be remarkable “that any graduate 
or cadet from the South remained loyal,” Schaff exhorted readers of his memoirs to 
“put yourself in their places – all the yearning ties of home, boyhood’s friends, 
sweethearts, the old plantations beckoning them from their fields and runs and 
woods, the firesides, the churchyards whose silent dust had called their boyish 
tears to flow fast as they stood beside the freshly dug graves – all appealing to 
them to go with their section, come what might.”70 
In addition, West Point must be absolved to some extent by the simple fact 
that prior to the Civil War, the concept of the United States as a nation was not a 
strong one.  As Carl Degler has pointed out, Abraham Lincoln’s assumption upon 
the outbreak of war “that a nation had been endangered,” and “that a sense of true 
nationhood already embraced the geographical area known as the United States . . . 
was not that held by many people of the time, and especially not by Southerners.”  
To most, writes Degler, the “Union was just a union of states, and not a nation in 
any organic sense.”71  Similarly, Henry Adams wrote of the winter of 1860-61, 
“secession was likely to be easy where there was so little to secede from.  The 
Union was a sentiment, but not much more.”72 
As would be expected in a nation with a weak sense of itself, American 
nationalism in the antebellum era was a far cry from what it would later become.  
As Benedict Anderson has famously noted, nations are “imagined communities.”  
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Normally, part of what gives weight to nationalism is the subjective antiquity of 
the nation in the eyes of its proponents – a concept that is squarely at odds with the 
historian’s conception of the nation as objectively modern.  In the case of the 
United States, however, the defining moment of its formation – the Declaration of 
Independence – was not only not grounded in history, but was perceived as a 
radical break with the past.73  In addition, as the Civil War would prove, the ideals 
of the Revolution were subject to widely varying interpretations.  Charles Royster 
points out that all of the participants in the Civil War “claimed to be guarding the 
legacy of the American Revolution.”  As a result, “two internally contradictory 
stories of nation-making . . . became justifications for a bitter war to establish 
which myth was true.”74  Even before the war, these conflicting interpretations 
undoubtedly contributed to the difficulty in viewing the United States as an organic 
entity rather than an artificial social construct. 
In a similar vein, Susan-Mary Grant has explained that the United States was 
actually two different “imagined communities.”  Rather than seeing antebellum 
Northern ideology as nationalistic, as have many other historians, Grant makes a 
convincing case that it was in fact sectional – relying on the South for definition 
and using it as a negative reference point.  This brand of national identity saw the 
South as fundamentally different from the rest of the country, even in terms of 
national ideals and experience.  These attitudes – although often portrayed as 
representing a national ideology due to the establishment of the Republicans as a 
national group despite their sectional ideology – were in fact “destructive of 
national cohesion.”75  With Grant’s analysis in mind, it becomes easier to 
understand why Northern “nationalism” at West Point failed to capture the hearts 
and minds of Southerners at the institution. 
Sectionalism was not the only barrier to the formation of a true national 
identity in the nineteenth century, however.  Major Wilson has asserted that several 
theoretical concepts of nationalism competed for primacy in the antebellum years.  
Proponents of corporative freedom, which was based on qualitative improvement 
and increasing order through institutionalization, clashed with advocates of 
federative freedom, who believed in independence from the influence of the 
federal government and stressed local and individual autonomy.  By the end of the 
1840s, however, this debate had given way to one over which element of the nation 
– free or slave – would have the right to expand.  The proponents of individual 
freedom – the Free Soilers – viewed themselves as representing the national ideal 
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of freedom against the expansion of an alien slave power.76  These differing 
philosophical conceptions of nationalism, in addition to the growing sectionalism 
of the time, provided further obstacles to the formation of a unitary vision of 
American nationalism in the antebellum years. 
Other historians agree that American citizens were being pulled in several 
different directions at once prior to the Civil War.  Melinda Lawson has identified 
sectional strife, class resentments, suspicion of centralized government, and anti-
abolitionist sentiment as factors competing with loyalty to the Union, even in the 
North.  In addition, most citizens located their primary identities in the states in 
which they lived, and were consequently more concerned with the rights of the 
states against the Union than the other way around.  As a result, Lawson asserts, 
“ambivalence about the national state became a mainstay of antebellum political 
culture.”77 
Similarly, David Waldstreicher has noted that American nationalism should 
not be studied in isolation, but rather must be looked at “in relation to other 
identities, beliefs, and practices.”  He stresses that national identity has always 
existed alongside local and regional identities, and that “nationalism is always one 
of several ideologies in a larger cultural field.”  Even nationalistic rituals – such as 
the ones that sometimes occurred at West Point – cannot be taken at face value, but 
must be read as politicized attempts among various contestants to claim true 
American nationality.78 
Clearly, any criticism of West Point in the antebellum years must take into 
account the ambiguous and contested nature of American nationalism during that 
period.  That being said, we will never know how many more Southerners may 
have been persuaded to remain with the Union had the leaders of the Academy 
taken a view closer to Lincoln’s and made a greater effort to take the lead in 
establishing a nationalistic spirit among those who would ultimately be charged 
with the country’s defense. 
Fortunately, the Military Academy’s failure in the antebellum years to instill 
its cadets with patriotism in addition to scientific and military knowledge 
undoubtedly provided lessons for the future.  In 1898, West Point introduced a new 
coat of arms along with a motto that has become famously associated with West 
Point in the years since:  “Duty, Honor, Country.”79  Four years later, upon West 
Point’s centennial, Secretary of War Elihu Root spoke hopefully of the future when 
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he made the famous promise that no army inspired by the spirit of West Point 
would ever again desert the United States.  Root sought to place West Point “in a 
new educational and military context,” and the Academy’s new motto perfectly 
summed up his goal.  From then on, West Point “would claim to produce not 
valuable technicians, but valuable men.”80 
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